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The objective of this paper is to study the structural
and functional relationship of the credit analysts and the loan
officers in various banks operating in Hong Kong through inter-
views with the officers concerned from various banks.
In order to enable comparison between banks of same
origin and of different origin, three European banks, three
American banks and three local banks were chosen for the study.
It was found that the structural and functional relation-
ship of the credit analysts and the loan officers was different
in the various banks, regardless of whether they were of the
same origin or not. It appeared that the variation might best
be explained by the difference in their size, history and
policy.
It had also been observed that there was a trend for the
banks in Hong Kong toward separating the jobs between credit
analysts and loan officers. Advantages and disadvantages were
discussed and bankers, when deciding whether to follow or to go
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the recent decade, Hong Kong has been growing into an
important financial centre in the Far East. Since the release of
the bank moratorium in 1978, the authorities began to license foreign
banks that wish to operate in Hong Kong. By the end of 1983, there
were 136 local and foreign banks in Hong Kong with over 1200 branches.
Besides the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank group, there are over 40
other domestic banks, including 13 that are associated with the
People's Republic of China. The remaining are foreign banks which
include American, European, Asian and other nations' banks.1
A number of the banks are involved in merchant banking activit-
ies, such as loan syndications, underwriting of capital issues and
issuance of commercial papers etc. The remaining majority are commer-
cial banks that offer a very wide range of retail and corporate bank-
ing services, such as current accounts, deposits, mortgage loans,
personal loans, commercial loans, trade financing and bills services,
corporate lending, funds transfers, administration of estates, private
trusts., investments services, life assurance, insurance broking,
credit cards, hire purchases, personal and corporate advisory and
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agency services, factoring and leasing etc.
1 Ian S. McCarthy," Financial System of Hong Kong."
Emerging Financial Centers. Edited by Robert C. Effros, Washington
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1982.
2 D. G. Hanson, Service Banking- The Arrival of the All Purpose
Bank. 2nd ed. London: The Institute of Bankers, 1982.
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Although banks are diversifying into services and business that
depart from traditional banking, corporate and commercial lending is
still one of the major sources of revenue for the commercial banks.
In the recent recession, many 'business failures occurred. It is
observed that banks, in the process of fulfilling their profit making
and 'risk assets' building activities, are now more cautious in their
credit extension. The credit analysis and lending functions of the
banks are, thus, becoming very important. Thorough credit analysis
and selective lending can save the banks from major bad loan losses
and credit write-offs. They also help banks to maintain a healthy
portfolio. The responsibility of lending out the banks' money to
trustworthy borrowers usually lies with the lending officers. Before
a loan is made, most banks will go through some credit analysis of
the borrower. This can be the job of the lending officer or of the
credit analyst.
The processing of a new loan normally involves an initial credit
check, credit and financial analysis of the borrower, the loan and
facility negotiation, the risk evaluation and credit approval, and
the final loan drawdown upon the ccmpletion of loan documentation.
All these steps are very important in most banks in some banks,
they are actually mandatory. The basis for confidence in lending is
through quantitative and qualitative analysis of the prospective
borrower. Frequent contact with the borrower is necessary both before
and after the loan is made. This is called loan monitoring and account
management. Once the loan or credit facility is granted to the
borrower, periodic evaluation and review of the credit facility and
the borrower is preferred. This is to ensure that the loan will not
go sour and that the borrower is still in a healthy financial position.
3This is also to ensure that the bank's secured facilities to the
borrower are sufficiently covered through the changes in time and
environment. The credit reviews are usually done on an annual basis
in stable times. More frequent reviews are done in recessionary
environments and on problematic loans. The whole credit process is
much more complicated than what we have described here. The credit
evaluation, analysis and the lending processes call for great respon-
sibility on the part of the banks' officers.
How are these above mentioned functions divided amongst the
banks' s credit analysts and the loan officers? Is there a difference
in the responsibilities and functions of the credit analysts and
loan officers in different banks, especially in banks of different
origin? If there are differences, what are they? Do the functional
and structural divisions of the credit analysts and loan officers in
banks of similar origin (i.e. they are either local or foreign banks)
show any similarities and patterns? In spite of Hong Kong's growing
importance as a financial centre in the Far East, no research on
this subject has been conducted.
The purpose of this paper is to discover how the foreign and
local banks are organized similarly or differently with respect to
the different functions of marketing, credit analysis and lending to
achieve the goals of profit-making, risk asset building and healthy
loan portfolio maintenance. Some banks divide the jobs between the
credit analysts and the loan officers, while others entrust these
functions entirely to the loan officers. As local banks comprise
about one-third of all the banks in Hong Kong, it is interesting to
know how these banks are similar or different in the division of jobs
between the credit analysts and the loan officers. Similarly, as the
American and European banks also have a significant presence in Hong
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Kong, it will be helpful to study how they are organised in the
respective functions under discussion. Through a series of inter-
views and observations, the structural and functional responsibilities
of the credit analysts and loan officers of these banks will be
compared in this paper.
It is the purpose of this paper to study:-
1) How American, European and local banks divide the functions of
credit analysis, marketing and lending.
2) The structural and functional relationship between the credit
analysts and the loan officers of these banks.
5CHAPTER II
THE LENDING PROCESS
When a potential borrower approaches a bank seeking a line of
credit, he must first file a formal application. In the application,
he has to state the purpose of the loan, the size of loan desired
and the financial conditions of his company. Usually this is followed
by an interview. Interviews are necessary for the bank to find out
the personal character of the borrower, his commitment and his ability
to repay the loan.
Then comes the most important part of the lending process--
the credit investigation. The bank will employ all sources available
to obtain credit information about the borrower. The information
may be obtained f r cm any one or more of the following sources:-
1) the financial statements of the borrower,
2) the borrower's past loan records,
3) the borrower's past dealings with other banks, and
4) trade checkings.
If the borrower passes this credit investigation, the loan
application will be given to the bank's authorized officer for
appr oval. 3
Assignment of Jobs
A) Application and Interview
This is usually conducted by the loan officers.
3 The Technical Division, Bank Administration Manual. Park
Ridge: Bank Administration Institute, 1970.
6B) Credit investigation
It has been found (Lim, 1973) that in small banks, this job is
also performed by the loan officers. 4 All credit information will be
kept by the loan officer himself. But in larger banks, this is the
main function of the credit department. Generally, the larger bank
will have a larger number of loan officers. In order to save them
time and to avoid their becoming indispensable, a centralized source
of credit information and records is kept in the credit file so that
any loan officer unfamiliar with the account can also read the file
and make a reasonable credit judgement. So a formal credit depart-
ment has to be established.
C) Formal approval
Banks differ in this aspect because they practice different
credit policies.
Yeung (1975) has observed that, in small banks, a loan might be
approved by the loan officer himself. Usually this authority is
limited. When the loan exceeds his authority, it will be referred
to another loan officer,, higher in position with greater authority.
In a medium-sized local bank, a loan has to be approved by a comm-
ittee, consisting of the loan officer, the credit manager and an
internal auditor. In a large foreign bank, loans have to be approved
by at least two officers, the loan officer together with either the
branch manager or the general manager of the main branch.5
4 T.F. Lim, "An Analysis of the Credit Functions of Commercial
Banks in Hong Kong." Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
1973.
5 L.Y. Yeung, "An Analysis of the Lending Policies of Commercial
Banks in Hong Kong." Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
1975..
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Functions of a Credit Department
1) Information gathering.
2) Record keeping- a credit file is maintained for each
borrower. All the information regarding the borrower's past loan
records, account opening date and financial statements is contained
in the file.
3) Credit analysis- the department evaluates the information
in the credit file. It anay lzes the borrower's financial stability
and ability to generate cash for repayment of the loan.
4) Recommendations- sometimes, the department may make
recommendations to loan officers or the management of the bank regard-
ing a loan proposal. 6
Organization of a Credit Department
Line Form
The credit department is structured as a separate independent
department, similar to other departments in the bank, such as the
loan and personnel departments. All these departments report to the
same senior management. Each department has no authority over the
other department, and inter-departmental communication has to be
intermediated by the senior management. This form has a number of
advantages. The staff in the credit department has a strong feeling
of responsibility. Communication is efficient within the department,
and the members have a high level of group identification. One dis-
advantage is that there can be difficulty in managing the various
departments.




This is an example of matrix organization. Although the staffs
of different departments have to report to the head of their own
department far daily operation, they may be grouped into special task
units. So each staff member may have to report to several superiors.
The advantage here is that expertise in a special field can be fully
utilized in an organization. But there are two disadvantages. One
is that the line authority is divided. The other is that the job
satisfaction of the staffs tends to be low because they may feel that
their special expertise has not been well used by other departments.
Line and Staff Form
Each staff member reports to only one superior, but each depart-
ment serves as staff functions for other departments. This creates
the advantage of having a single line of authority while providing
special service to all other departments. 7
These three forms are diagramatica fly sketched in Appendix 1.
Functions of a Credit Ana lyst
The functions of the credit analyst:-
1) To analyze and evaluate the credit information obtained by the
credit investigator, concentrating mostly on the balance sheet and the
profit and loss statement supplied by the borrower.
2) To condense the credit information for the information and guidance
of the loan officer.
7 Credit Research Foundation. Credit Management Handbook.
2nd ed. Chicago: Irwin-Dorsey. 1965.
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Functions of a Loan Officer
The functions of the loan officer:-
1) To evaluate the information supplied by the credit analyst and to
decide whether to decline or approve the loan.
2) To conduct interviews with the borrowers.
3) To screen the application of the borrower.
4) To manage the borrowing accounts throughout the life of the loan.
5) To handle delinquent loans approved by him or herself. 8
8 The Technical Division. Bank Administration Manual.




The Basic P tan
As mentioned in Chapter I, the purpose of this paper is to
survey the structural and functional relationship between the credit
analysts and the loan officers. The basic method employed in this
research was of qualitative nature. 'Depth interviews' were performed
with selected officers f r an nine different banks. The officers inter-
viewd were holding either the post of credit analyst or loan officer
or were in a position to describe in deatil the structure of the organ-
ization and the different functions and responsibilities of the post
concerned.
The interviews were informal. Throughout the course of the
interview, the atmosphere was friendly and casual. The interviewees
were at ease, so the actual facts required by the study were obtained.
No formal and structured questionnaires were used in the interviews,
but the questions asked covered the following issues:-
1) the formal organizational structure of the bank;
2) the functions of credit administration/control department, the
credit department or, in case none was established, of the credit
analysts;
3) the functions of the loan officers;
4) the lending process and procedures required;
5) the degree of dependence of loan decisions on the recommendations
made by the credit analysts;
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6) the sources of obtaining customers /borrowers' credit inf ormation
by the credit analysts and the loan officers and
7) the future trend in the division of responsibility between the
credit analysts and the loan officers.
All the interviews were carried out by the two researchers of
this study. In most cases, both of them were present at the inter-
view. Where circumstances did not allow, one of them conducted the
interviews by him or herself. As the interviews might touch upon
certain sensitive areas, the research did not involve the use of
written questionnaires and tape recorders during the interviews.
Note taking was kept to a minimum in order to reduce any tension on
the part of the interviewee. The interviews usually started with
general greetings. In all cases, the researchers stated very clearly,
at the beginning of the interviews, the purpose of the research and
the fact that the research was purely for academic study. This was
to minimize the suspicions of the interviewees about the researchers
as both are also officers of two banks in Hong Kong. During the
interviews, broad general questions were asked first, followed by
more specific questions. The interviewees were allowed to speak freely
on the topic being discussed in order to facilitate information gather-
ing. The interviewers listened very carefully and later recorded all
the relevant information required by the research. In most cases, the
interviewers had to guide the interviewees in answering the questions
by giving examples. During the whole interviewing process, the
researchers used the seven points listed above as the structural guide
for the questions being asked. Depending on the circumstances, the
interviewee, and the atmosphere, the questions, although concerning
the same information, might be phrased differently. Detailed
notes on the relevant information were immediately taken after the
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interviews. On two occasions, the researchers had to revert back to
the interviewees or had to go to another source for clarification of
certain facts and issues. The notes were then reorganized in the
sequence and structure of the seven basic questions under research
listed on the previous page in order to facilitate analysis and
comparison of results.
Sample Selection
The 136 banks in Hong Kong can be categorized as domestic banks
and foreign banks. Of the more than 40 domestic banks, 13 are related
to the People's Republic of China. Due to limited time and resources
and the perceived differences of the PRC banks from other banks, none
of these 13 banks were included in the sample of this research. The
researchers of this study recommend that future research develop a
separate but similar study with the PRC banks. For the purpose of this
study, three local banks of different sizes were chosen in the sample.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the American and the European banks
have significant presence amongst the foreign banks in Hong Kong.
Therefore, three of each category above were included in the sample
of nine. As the British have had great influence in Hong Kong since
the nineteeth centry (the first bank established in Hong Kong was a
British bank in 1859), a major British bank was chosen for the sample.
On the other hand, the French banks have, in the recent decade, been
expanding rapidly both in the international banking world generally
and in Hong Kong. As they appear to be very aggressive in the Hong
Kong market, two French banks were included in the sample of European
banks.
Due to the limited time and resources of the researchers, a
moderate sample was chosen for the purpose of this study. In order to
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have a better cross-section of the banking sector, the samples picked
were basically divided into three size categories, namely, large,
medium and small. Banks of different sizes are represented in the
three groups of local, American and European banks. The choice of
the basis for size determination was a difficult one. Generally, we
would use 'total assets' or 'total profits' generated from this market
as measures. However, such information, especially on the foreign
banks, is not published nor readily available in Hong Kong. Thus, the
researchers had to use 'number of staff employed' and the 'perceived
size' of the banks by the general public as a yardstick for size
determination. The use of 'number of employees' is particularly
deceiving as a retail bank would definitely have a larger number of
staff than a wholesale bank and their size in terms of risk assets
(which is generally a more acceptable measurement criterion) would
not necessarily be positively correlated. Handicapped by the lack
of available information, the researchers had to resort to the second
best criterion, which is the public's perception of a bank's size as
the size determining factor.
The Interviews
Nine interviews were made with the representatives from the sample
banks. One interview each was held in seven sample banks and two with
one sample bank. As one of the researchers of this study is herself
a credit and marketing officer in one of the nine sample banks, no
interview was made there. Instead, a detailed record was made on her
can experience and observations in the bank on the issues under study.
All the interviewees meet our requirement of being able to give
a fair account of the structure of the organization, the various roles
and functions of the credit analysts and the loan officers, the source
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of credit information generally obtained, the dependence, if any, of
loan approval on the credit analysts' recommendations, and the trend
of development in that particular bank with respect to the division
of responsibility between the credit analysts and the loan officers.
Not counting one of the researchers herself, four of the interviewees
were credit or loan officers, two were credit analysts, one was the
head of a bank's credit control and credit analysis department, one
was an assistant branch manager who takes part in loan negotiations,
and one-was a personnel officer who knew the detailed job responsibi-
lities of the officers and had wide experience in bank operation.
Most of the interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours.
Every interview was carried out smoothly. A general exchange of
greetings warmed up the relationship and created an atmosphere of
confidence at the beginning of each interview. Then broad questions
on the issues under study were asked. The interviewees were allowed
to express themselves freely, and the researcher interrupted only
when the discussion went astray. Specific questions were asked to
keep the interviewees on track and to obtain more relevant information.
The researchers did not use tape recorders during the interviews.
On several occasions and with the permission of the interviewees, the
researchers jotted down minimal notes for later reference. Following
the interviews, the results were recorded in detailed note form accord-
ing to an outline covering all the issues to be researched. The use
of this structured outline facilitated the researchers to remember
the details of the interview and discover topics missed during the
discussions. The outline also facilitated the analysis of the inform-
ation obtained in the study. On most occasions, the detailed notes
were made within several hours after the interviews so that the
information was still fresh in the researchers' memories. All inform-
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ation required for the study was successfully obtained.
On two occasions, the researchers promised to provide a copy of
the final research paper to the interviewees. On all occasions, the
interviewees requested that the information be kept confidential
and that specific results and information not be related to the
specific banks' names in the final paper. Generalization and





As discussed in Chapter III, the research included interviews
with nine banks, three from each of the same origin. As one of the
purposes of this research is to compare the policies of the banks
from the same origin, banks of different size were selected in order
to make the results more representative of the entire spectrum. In
order to consolidate the focus of this study, the writers chose not
to include banks associated with the People's Republic of China,
although there were over 13 such banks at the time the research was
conducted. Then the remaining banks were categorized according to
their place of origin, that is, whether they were European banks,
American banks or local banks. Next, the banks in each category were
classified into three groups according to their size, that is, by
either their total assets or their perceived size as discussed earlier
in Chapter III. Finally f r an each of these nine groups, one name was
selected randomly to be the representative sample of the study.
For confidentiality, the nine names will not be disclosed in this
paper. However, their structure and characteristics will be described
below as this information is valuable when discussing the results.
This information is also tabulated in Appendix II.9
9 This information is obtained from either "Data Base. A
Directory of All Licensed Banks in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Database.
1982" or "The Bankers' Almanac and Year Book 1979-1980. London:
IPC Business Press. 1980"
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Bank A- its main off ice is registered in London. It has the
largest overseas operation among the banks in The United Kingdom.
Its total assets amounted to over US$39 ,241, 000 ,000 in 1982. The
bank was established in 1853 in London and was the first bank to
start business in Hong Kong in 1859. Today, it has over 106 branches
in Hong Kong. I t was the 52nd largest bank in the world in terms of
total assets in 1982. Its local management is regionalized.
Bank B- it ranks among the top three banks in the world. Its
total assets exceeded US$109,944,000,000 in 1982. The bank was
established in 1932 in Paris and it started business in Hong Kong
in 1959. It maintains a small retail operation line in Hong Kong,
totalling 21 branches in 1984.
Bank C- the bank was established in 1968 at its base in Paris
with total assets exceeding US$51,584,000,000 in 1982. It was the
32nd largest bank in the world in 1982. It started its operation in
Hong Kong in 1978 and its operation is limited, concentrating mostly
in merchant banking. It has only one branch office in Hong Kong.
Bank D- it is an American bank established in 1812 and based
in New York. The bank is the largest in the world in terms of total
assets. Its total assets amounted to US$120,680,000,000 in 1982. It
started business in Hong Kong in 1902 and it now maintains over 28
branches in Hong Kong.
Bank E- it was established in 1955 in New York. Its total
assets were over US$77,050,000,000 in 1982. It ranks among the top
fifteen banks in the world and top three in the United States. Its
retail operation in Hong Kong, established in 1963, include 14
branches.
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Bank F- it came to Hong Kong only in 1979 and has only one
branch office. The parent bank was established in 1863 at its base
in Chicago. Its total assets were over US$34,410,000,000 in 1982
and it ranks among the top 60 banks in the world.
Bank G- it is a leading local bank with worldwide assets valued
at over US$57 ,132, 000 ,000 in 1982. It ranks among the top 24 banks
in the world. It was established here in 1866 and has over 288
branches in Hong Kong alone. It has expanded its overseas operation
and investment many-fold recently.
Bank H- the bank was established in 1933 in Hong Kong. I t has
over 86 branches locally, but its overseas operation is limited to 2
branch offices. Its total assets were over HK$32,294,800,000 in 1982.
Bank I- it is a small local bank with total assets of just about
HK$3,977,848,000 in 1981. It was incorporated here in 1948. Bank I
now has 21 branches in Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER V
OVERALL RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH
Credit Department
Of the nine banks that were interviewed, only four had
established a formal centralized credit department. However, due to
the different interpretation of the term 'credit department' by the
various banks, it seems more useful to break the term dawn into its
functional aspects and to classify the departments according to their
functions. As discussed in Chapter II, the three major functions of
a credit department are
(i) credit administration,
(ii) credit analysis, and
(iii) credit control.
Using the classification above, the results indicated that all
the nine banks interviewed had credit administration departments.
Among them, eight were centralized and one was decentralized. This is
reasonable fran the viewpoint of cost and benefit. Credit administra-
tion involves mainly clerical and filing work, so it is more economical
to have the credit information of all accounts kept by one work unit
and thus, this rendered available more readily to any officer of the
bank. The fact that all the nine banks had credit administration
departments indicated that, regardless of the degree of dependence of
loan decisions on the results of credit analysis or on the work of
credit analysts discussed later in this chapter, keeping credit informa-
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tion on customers is important and indispensable from the bankers'
point of view. Bank D is exceptional in that, besides having a
general credit administration department at its Head Office in Hong
Kong, it also has a large number of decentralized credit administra-
tion units supporting each credit and marketing group.
From the interview, it was observed that, although all the nine
banks had credit administration departments, only six of them estab-
lished credit analysis departments or units to perform the quantitative
work of credit analysis, which includes spreading of the financial
statements and financial ratios calculation. Only six of them had
formal credit control departments, the responsibilities of which were
to check whether a loan was made in accordance with the bank's policies
and to advise on any loan that needed special measures to strengthen
the credit. In some banks, there were independent departments that
served as an internal control unit in addition to the credit control
department. All the four banks that had formal credit departments
also assigned the responsibility of annual review of loans to the
department. Of the remaining five banks that did not have a credit
department, only one required its credit analysis unit to perform the
annual review job.
Bank A did not have a credit department in its operation in Hong
Kong, but it had a sophisticated credit department at its Main Office
in London. It had a centralized credit administration department whose
function primarily was to gather and keep custromers' credit informa-
tion. No analytical work was done by this department. This. was the
only department that handled customers' credit. Credit control was
performed by an independent unit called a 'loan committee' which served
as a staff unit in each area district.
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Bank B did not have a centralized credit department. However,
every branch or banking division had its own unit of credit administra-
tion and credit anaylsis. The credit function was completely decentra-
lized. This unit was also responsible for making the annual review
of loans. The credit control functions were performed by the general
credit administration department and a 'risk department' at its Head
Office in Hong Kong.
Bank C also had no formal credit department established in Hong
Kong, but it had work units to perform the functions of credit
administration, credit analysis and credit control.
Bank D did not have a centralized credit department, but it had
a centralized credit administration department which was also respon-
sible for credit control.
Bank E and Bank F were very similar with respect to their credit
department's structure. They both had centralized credit departments,
which served the purposes of credit administration, credit analysis
and annual review, but they did not handle credit control functions.
Bank G and Bank H also showed great similarities in this respect.
They had centralized credit departments, which handled all aspects of
credit work- credit administration, credit analysis, credit control
and annual loan review.
Bank I had a small credit administration department, which kept
all the bank's customers' credit information, but it had no functional
units established to carry out the work of credit analysis, credit
control or annual review.
Credit Analysts
All the four banks that had formal credit departments also had
the posts of credit analysts in their establishment. Besides these
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four, there were two other banks, Bank B and Bank C,, which employed
credit analysts. The major function of these credit analysts was to
perform the quantitative aspects of credit analysis. Bank C was
distinctive in that its credit analysts were assigned to various work
groups and, where the group did not have credit analysts, the loan
officers would have to prepare the loan proposals as well. Bank E
also required their credit analysts to write up the loan proposals,
but it was different form Bank C in that their write-ups contained
no innovative ideas, and the proposal was written simply as directed
by the loan officer.
Recommendation on loan proposals by credit analysts was found
in only two banks, Bank B and Bank G. In most cases, these credit
analysts did not need to meet with customers, but in four banks, it
was reported that the credit analysts meet customers and they might
ask customers questions to clarify some aspects regarding their
financial statements in the presence of the loan officer. This was
particularly true for Bank G, which had a number of credit analysts
grouped into units called 'work-out' units. These units were respon-
sible for investigating problem loans and would visit customers'
business, if necessary. So these credit analysts did have direct
contact with customers. The major sources of credit information for
these analysts were the financial statements and trade checkings,
except for Bank I, which did not look at customers' financial state-
ments in considering loan advances to them.
Loan Officers
The primary responsibilities of the loan officers were marketing,
and negotiating, and making a qualitative analysis of the loan proposal.
In addition, they had to prepare the loan proposal. The only exceptional
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case was Bank E, which assigned the job of writing up the proposal to
the credit analysts but still the idea of the entire proposal and
recommendations was given by the loan officers. In two of the nine
banks, the loan officers had to do the quantitative analysis of the
loan. This is easy to understand as both of these banks did not have
credit analysts to assist the loan officers.
It was observed that in four of the banks, the loan officers
were given the authority to approve the loan themselves if the loan
was within the limit of their authority.
Approval Process and Review of Loan
It was observed that in all cases, the senior management of the
banks was involved early in the process of loan negotiating, even if
the loan was within the limit of authority of the first line loan
officers. This was usual in practice because it lightened the respon-
sbility of the loan officer and reduced the risk of loan failures as
a more experienced and independent opinion was obtained.
With the excetpion of Bank D and Bank I, which required all loans
to be approved by a loan committee, all other banks entrusted the loan
approval authority to their loan officers, group heads or general
managers, who might singly approve loans themselves. If the loan or
credit facility exceeded the approval limit of the loan officer her or
himself, a higher authority's approval had to be obtained. Bank D's
loan committee consisted of three members, which might or might not
include the loan officer who originally negotiated the loan with the
customer. The loan committee of Bank I consisted of five members,
including the General Manager, who also happened to be the head of the
loan department, as the chairman, and the heads of the four other
operational departments. Usually the General Manager had the greatest
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influence over the other members on decision-making. Considering
that Bank I placed no dependence on credit analysis and the work of
credit analysts, this indicated that the bank is very conservative
in its lending policy and very limited in its portfolio. Most
decisions were made by the General Manager alone and based on his
subjective judgement on the cu s t aver' s credit standings.
Bank H showed moderate dependence on credit analysis and the
work of its credit analysts. That is, a loan might be approved before
any credit analysis was done on the custaner's financial statements,
but the financial statements would sooner or later be passed on to
the credit analysts for analysis. If the performance of the customer
was proved dissatisfactory from the analysis, the loan officer who
approve the loan would be requested to explain his or her decision
and to take measures, if needed, to improve the loan and the security
level. In the case of most new customers, credit analysis would have
to be performed first before a decision was reached, and a loan pro-
posal might be turned down solely due to bad results of the analysis.
All the other seven banks indicated high dependence on credit
analysis for loan decisions, whether the analysis was performed by the
credit analyst or the loan officer him or herself.
For the four banks that had formal credit departments, the work
of annual loan review was assigned to the credit department. This
indicates that, from the bankers' point of view, the job of annual loan
review is typically one of those of a credit department. For the rest
of the banks, three required their loan officers to do the annual loan
review, one let the credit analysts to do it and one, Bank B, required
both the loan officers and credit analysts to work independently.
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Structural Relationship Between Credit Analysts
and Loan Officers
The nine banks interviewed showed different structural relation-
ships between their credit analysts and loan officers. This variation
might be accounted for by the difference in the management policies
and the functional needs of the banks. Bank A had no credit analysts.
Bank B and Bank C both indicated a matrix structure for their credit
analysis department. Their credit analysts and loan officers were
grouped into various work units which were found in every division and
branch. Their credit analysts' job was mainly to help out the loan
officers in the clerical works and in the area of quantative analysis.
Bank D did not have any credit analysts in its organization. Bank E
had a line-and-staff form. Its credit analysts were centralized in
a credit department and served in staff positions to the loan officers.
The interesting point is that its credit department actually reported
to the head of the credit and marketing department. So a close
relationship between the credit analysts and loan officers could be
achieved. Bank K, Bank G and Bank H all had line form structure.
Their credit analysis departments were separate independent departments
requiring formal procedures for inter-departmental communications.
Bank I had no credit analyst at all.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN, AMERICAN AND LOCAL BANKS
The three European banks did not have formal credit departments.
This is quite distinct from the other two groups, where two-thirds of
each of them had credit departments. But all the European and American
banks showed strong dependence on credit analysis when making a loan
decision, while one local bank indicated no dependence and one indicated
moderate dependence. This implies that the existence of a formal credit
department is not indicative of the bank's dependence on credit analysis
for loan decisions. As a matter of fact, the European banks placed the
strongest emphasis on credit control as all three European banks had
special independent committees or departments to check the regularity
of the approval process, whereas only one American bank and two local
banks indicated the existence of similar departments.
Although the three European banks did not have formalized credit
departments, they placed strong emphasis on the work of credit analysis.
In bank A, this job was performed by the loan officers themselves.
In bank B and bank C, it was performed by the credit analysts. All
these European banks had independent departments to serve the function
of credit control. This is different from the rest of the banks that
did not have any special departments to handle this job or simply had
the credit department performing it. The three banks had indicated
that their loan decisions were based fairly heavily on the results of
credit analysis, but only one bank, bank B, indicated significant
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dependence on the work of credit analysts for loan decisions. The
reason is that bank A did not hire any credit analysts at all and
bank C, due to its small number of credit and marketing officers, had
its credit analysts serving as a supporting staff to do the quantit-
ative work only.
As for the American banks, the three banks interviewed all placed
great emphasis on the results of credit analysis. This is similar to
the European banks. The major difference lies in the establishment
of formal credit department. Two out of the three American banks had
formal credit departments, which employed traditional credit analysts
to perform the usual work of credit analysis. But this does not lead
to the conclusion that the banks depend more on the work of credit
analysts. On the contrary, all three American banks indicated that
their loan decisions had little dependence on the work of credit
analysts. Bank D is understandable as it does not hire any credit
analysts in its organization. The job of credit analysis is performed
by the loan officers themselves. It takes deeper thought to understand
why Bank E and Bank F behave alike. This involves how they place
their credit analysts into their organzational structure. Although
credit analysts in Bank E are under the authority of the credit depart-
ment, their work is closely supervised by the loan officers. They
are told what to do and even how to write up the proposals. All the
ideas are from the loan officers. In bank F, the work of the credit
analysts is to perform the quantitative analysis on loan applications
as instructed by the loan officers.
At this point, it is necessary to look into the policy of Bank D
in order to explain its special behaviour. Bank D is an American bank
with a medium size retail branch chain in Hong Kong. Its district
management in Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy and discretion
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in shaping its local policies. This explains why Bank D is fairly
innovative and pioneering in all aspects, the credit policy being one
of them. Prior to 1980, Bank D had no formal credit administration
department., but it did employ a number of credit analysts to perform
the work of credit analysis. Then in 1980, the bank established a
centralizaed credit analysis department on a trial basis. The change
was apparently a reflection of the bank's need at that time. Then
at the end of 1983, the credit analysis department was dissolved and
became decentralized. The post of credit analyst was also abolished
even earlier in the middle of 1982. The work of credit analysis was,
from then on, included in the job of the loan officer. So the job of
the loan officer includes marketing, preparing loan proposals and all
the analytical work. As one loan officer is doing all the work himself
or herself, he or she has a better understanding of the customer and
can do a more thorough analysis. In order to avoid any irregularities
in deciding on whether to approve the loan or not, the loan application
has to be approved by a credit committee, of which the loan officer
may or may not be a member.
This centralization and decentralization of the credit department
in Bank D do not represent the trend of its policy regarding the
establishmnet of a credit department. It only shows that bank D is
still searching for a better way to meet its structural need in this
respect.
The local banks are quite different from the foreign banks in
their attitudes toward the usefulness of credit analysis. Only Bank
G showed some similarities with the foreign banks, in a way that its
loan decisions depend quite heavily on credit analysis and it employs
a fairly large number of credit analysts in its structure. This could
be explained by the fact that bank G has expanded its overseas operation
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significantly in the past few years, and it has become an international
business concern. Its credit analysts play an even more active role
than those of foreign banks in that a number of them are joined to
form a 'work-out' unit that actually meets with the problem clients
to help them in making financial decisions.
Both bank H and bank I indicated that their loan processes do
not include much credit analysis and so their loan decisions depend
very little on the results of credit analysis. Bank I did not have
credit analysts in its structure. Bank H had a formal credit depart-
ment and a small number of credit analysts, who performed the work
of credit analysis. Bank I had no credit department at all. All its
loan decisions were based on the subjective judgement of its top
management.
These two banks are actually, strictly speaking, the only local
banks that have been interviewed. Their operations were mainly con-
fined to the area of Hong Kong and their overseas operations were
still in the infant stage. Their target customers were almost all
local businessmen. Their lending policies were very conservative and
most of their loans were asset-based. Their asset portfolios were
narrow but could be considered to be 'very safe'.
This could explain why the two banks might not require much
credit analysis. Their loan decisions are based on the quality of the
collateral and not on the reliability of their customers. But it is
questionable whether the 'safe' collateral are 'absolutely safe'. Both
banks indicated that they have experienced a larger volume of-bad debts
in the past two or three years. The quality of the collateral has often
proved,to be as volatile as the reliability of the borrowers. So it
becomes more and more important for bankers to look at the quality of
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the borrowers, not just at the quality of the-collateral. Bank H
indicated in the interview that it might shift to a greater depend-
ence on credit analysis for all its loan decisions in the future.




As seen in the previous two chapters, all the banks have at
least a credit administration department, which does the basic
clerical filing, follow up of documents, bank checking, trade check-
ing and credit checking, etc. The staff of this credit administration
department does only the clerical part of the job they do not do any
credit analysis of the loans. On the other hand, six of the nine banks
have either a credit analysis department or a group of analysts doing
credit analysis for the loan officers. During the past three years,
three of the nine banks set up a new credit analysis department or
employed a group of credit analysts (which is attached either to the
credit and marketing departments or to the loan officers' department).
Conversely, one of the foreign banks abolished the credit
analysis department two years ago, but retained the credit analysis
responsibility with the loan officers. One local bank does not have
any credit analyst at all in fact, written credit analysis is not
required for any loans made. For this bank, credit extended is based
on the appraisal of the borrower by the bank's senior management.
This is a very conservative and traditional way of offering credit.
Though we cannot draw a general conclusion that all banks, local
and foreign, will have a credit analysis department in the very near
future, we can definitely conclude that the trend is towards the
establishment of credit analysis departments and towards the division
of responsibilities between the credit analysts and the loan officers.
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The development of the structural and functional relationship
between the credit analysts and the loan officers depends, for the
most part, on the size, history and the business nature of the banks.
One definite conclusion we can draw is the growing importance of the
requirement of quality credit analysis in all banks.
It is observed that some banks established credit analysis
departments for some of the following reasons:-
1) To have an independent and objective second opinion on the credit
and the borrower.
2) To provide better risk control.
3) To provide training for the trainees who may be promoted to the
post of loan officers in the future.
4) To relieve the loan officers of sane of their work load of doing
credit and financial analyses of the borrowers. With the help of
the credit analysts, the loan officers can spend more time in
business solicitation and account management.
5) Sane banks' loan officers do not have solid training in financial
analysis but have instead other bank operational experience. Thus,
the bank management would prefer to set up a credit analysis depart-
ment to make thorough analyses of the major credits and to provide
second opinions on the credit extensions as counter check.
6) For some banks, the credit analyst job provides opportunities for
staff members with strong financial background who prefer desk
work to that of meeting customers. Then the banks can leave the
major business solicitation and loan negotiation to the credit and
marketing officers the credit analysts become the back-office
support for the credit and marketing officers.
The above are also sane of the major advantages of having a
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credit analysis department and separating the functions of the credit
analyst and the loan officer. However, some disadvantages of having
a separate credit analysis department are:-
1) Since most of the credit analysts seldom meet customers, they work
only with the figures and obtain information about the borrowers f r an
the loan officers when doing the analyses. The analysts, therefore,
do not have first-hand information on the borrowers, and have to rely
largely on the financial statements (which can be misleading at times)
when doing the analyses. The resultant analyses may not be very
thorough or meaningful.
2) When the dependence on the credit analyst's recommendations in
loan decisions is not strong, then some of the efforts of the credit
analyst are wasted. Further, job satisfaction for the credit analyst
is reduced.
On the other hand, placing the responsibility of credit analysis
with the loan officer has the following advantages:-
1) Since the loan officer is the primary contact of the borrower, his
or her understanding of the borrower's business is better. Based on
his or her own observation of the borrower's worthiness, management
integrity, business objectives and strategies and combined with the
information obtained f r an the financial statements, the loan officers'
analysis about the borrower can be more thorough and meaningful.
2) If head count is a problem, as in the case of some American banks,
then combining the functions of the credit analyst and the loan
officer is beneficial.
However, relying solely on the loan officers to do the credit
analysis may have the following disadvantages:-
1) If the loan officer can make decision and grant a loan independently,
then there will not be a second opinion on the credit acting as a
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counter check.
2) The loan officer will have less time to do marketing when he or
she has to allocate some of his or her limited time to do the credit
analyses.
It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgement on which
type of organizational structure is better. However, the management
of any specific bank can evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages
of organizational structures with or without credit analysts or credit
analysis department, and taking the bank's size, business nature and
resources into consideration, then design an organizational structure
which suits that bank best.
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APPENDIX 1
ORGANIZATION OF A CREDIT DEPARTMENT
1. Line form
Credit ManagerPersonnel ManagerLoan Manager
Credit StaffPersonnel StaffLoan Staff
2. Functional form
Credit ManagerPersonnel ManagerLoan Manager
Personnel Staff
Credit StaffLoan Staff
3. Line and Staff form






Bank A Bank B Bank C BANK D BANK E BANK F BANK G BANK H BANK I
1853 1932 1968 1812 1955 1863 1866 1933 1943
Year of Incorporation
(parent bank)
1859 1959 1978 1902 1963 1979 1866 1933 1948Year Established in
Hong Kong
106 21 1 27 14 1 289 71 27Number of Branches in
Hong Kong
39,241 109,944 5 1,584 120,680 77,050 34,410 57,132 32,294# 3,977#Total Assets in 1982
(in Million U.S.$)
52 3 32 1 15 60 24Rank in World
(Total Assets)
London Paris Paris New York New York Chicago Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong KongBase of Parent Bank
The figures are for December 1981 and are quoted in million HK$.
The worldwide ranking of these two banks was not available.
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APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF THE OVERALL RESULTS#
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H Bank I
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The researchers faced several problems during the research
process:-
1) There was some reluctance on the part of the interviewees to
release-some information for fear of exposing some sensitive issues.
This may have affected the overall result. However, the researchers
were aware of this problem in advance and reassured all interviewees
that no confidential information would be release in the final paper.
2) Different banks sometimes have different titles for the same job.
Associating actual jobs with the titles used in the sample banks was
a lengthy process.
3) As in many student projects, the elements of limited time and
resources must be taken in account in forming conclusion from the
research.
Recommendations For Further Study
Although the scope and sample of this study are quite limited,
we believe some insights have been made into the issues researched.
We can conclude from the sample banks in this survey that there is a
growing emphasis on thorough credit analysis for the better project-
ion of banks' assets. We would suggest these related projects for
future researchers:
1) To make a similar study on the PRC d ones t is banks.
2) To develop a larger sample size, which involved other European
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